A comment I made on Facebook. Saving it here.
As for your other question, look in John of St. Thomas, Phil. Nat., pt.1, q. 10, a. 2 (p. 200ff in the Reiser edition). He holds something of a univocist position while arguing against Suarez's position on the matter. However, he was argued against by F-X Maquart in the final volume of the latter's Elementa Philosophia, p. 203-204. Maquart lies in line with the school on most things. The latter holds that it is a properly proportional unity. The argument seems to hold well in my book: "Diversa enim habitudo ad esse impedit univocationem entis et introducit analogiam proportionalitatis, ut dictum est pro ente quod dicit diversas habitudines ad esse. Atqui conceptus cause diversificatur secundum diversas habitudines _dandi_ esse: aliter enim dat esse effectus causa materialis, causa formalis, causa efficiens, et causa finalis."
Garrigou-Lagrange holds that it is properly proportional. I would have to dig up the references if you need them. They're somewhat random. And there will be internal proportionalities too within different lines of causality (thus, intrinsic vs. extrinsic formal causality (the latter being arguably analogically subdivided too into objective and signative); primary efficient causality vs. instrumental efficient causality).
I looked this up in Woodbury's notes, but on this topic, he's just translating Maquart. A quick glance at Hugon's metaphysics treatise didn't shed more light on it. Take a look at the relevant disputation by Suarez to see if you can find other references before him.
Just a few thoughts. Hopefully this puts you down some useful paths. I think that Maquart's line is correct, though. In each case, the "giving of existence" in question is quite different. Dependence upon a material cause for existence is utterly different from dependence upon an extrinsic formal cause for existence. Yet, both are causal. I think this is a classic and perfect case of the usefulness of proper proportionality.
Also, Cahalan in his upcoming essay in the AMA volume I am editing cites
Efficient causality, said of transitive action and immanent action (“An Essay on the Classification of Action and the Understanding of Act" ed. John N. Deely, Revue de l’Universite d’Ottawa, 41, no. 4 (1971): 518-541); Philosopher at Work, 64-71
I'm surprised he doesn't have more on causality in a long list that he has here.